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ABSTRACT Smart card-based remote authentication schemes are widely used in multi-medical-
server-based telecare medicine information systems (TMISs). Biometric is one of the most trustworthy
authenticators and is presently being advocated to use in the remote authentication of TMIS. However, most
of the existing TMISs consider a single-server-environment-based authentication system. Therefore, patients
need to register and log into every server separately for different services. Furthermore, these schemes do not
employ error correction technique to remove the errors from biometric data. Also, biometrics are inherent
and demand diversification to generate a revocable template from inherent biometric data. In this paper,
we propose a mutual authentication and key agreement scheme for a multi-medical server environment to
overcome the limitations of the existing schemes. In the proposed scheme, a cancelable transformation of
the raw biometric data is used to provide the privacy and the diversification of biometric data. The errors of
the biometric data are corrected with error-correction techniques under the fuzzy commitment mechanism.
A formal security analysis using the widely accepted real-or-random model, the Burrows–Abadi–Needham
logic, and the automated validation of Internet security protocols and applications tool concludes that the
proposed scheme is safe against known attacks. We also compare the computation and communication costs
of our scheme to evaluate the performance with the others.
INDEX TERMS Telecare medicine information system (TMIS), fuzzy commitment scheme, BAN logic,
real-or-random (ROR), AVISPA tool.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, people are accessing more and more services
through the Internet. For example, they use different elec-
tronic gadgets likemobile phones and notebooks to get access
to a remote server from anywhere through a public channel.
Many countries already introduced e-Health and telemedicine
services for easy and wide access to health care services
with high availability. Example e-Heath and telemedicine
systems include ManageMyHealth (New Zealand), National
Health Portal (Government Of India), eCWHeath Care Portal
(eClinicalWorks, Georgia), and Boynton Health (University
of Minnesota). In recent years, Internet services and low-
cost mobile devices make the e-Health care and telemedicine
services available directly to the patient [15]. With e-Health
care, patients are able to access different healthcare assistance
without visiting the healthcare center physically but through
the Internet. Conventional clinical medical service system
can be replaced by distance nursing, e-health care and home
monitoring facility [15], [17], [18]. In TMIS, patients can
remotely check-up their vital signs and physician can read
the up-to-date medical information of a patient using a public
network channel. However, the security of the patient’s sensi-
tive information to prevent unauthorized access by an attacker
is crucial. At the same time, the protection of patient’s pri-
vacy during the remote access of telecare services is another
important concern [15], [64].
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With respect to the aforementioned context, a remote
authentication scheme can be employed to ensure a secure
access to TMIS by patients as well as physicians over inse-
cure channels. Lamport [13] introduced password-based
authentication in 1981, in which the server stored all the
passwords into a password table. Therefore, the scheme is
susceptible to stolen-verifier attacks. Dictionary attacks may
guess a passwordwith low entropy.Moreover, since the social
information of a user is typically used to select a password,
social engineering may reveal the password easily with the
knowledge of the user’s social information. To overcome
these problems, smart cards have been combined with the tra-
ditional password authentication to form a two-factor-based
authentication scheme. Unfortunately, the stolen smart card
may reveal stored information under power analysis [10] and
differential attacks [11].
Recently, Wu et al. [23] used passwords and smart cards to
design a two-factor-based remote authentication scheme for
TMIS. He et al. [24] performed a cryptanalysis onWu et al.’s
scheme [23] and they concluded that the scheme [23]
failed to resist the impersonation attacks, the insider attacks
and the stolen smart card attacks. He et al. [24] pro-
posed another authentication scheme for TMIS, which can
overcome all weaknesses of [23]. Unfortunately, such a
scheme is vulnerable to off-line password guessing attacks.
As a remedy, Zhu [25] proposed an authentication scheme
using RSA-cryptosystem. The research from [26]–[29] also
failed to ensure the robustness of the remote authentication
scheme using passwords and smart cards. As a new direc-
tion, researchers are exploring the use of biometric data
(e.g. fingerprint, iris [6], [16], [20]) with traditional authen-
tication schemes [3]. In general, three-factor-based authenti-
cation schemes are introduced to improve the security of the
patient’s information [30]–[34].
Furthermore, the existing schemes from [21]–[25] and [35]
overlook the user’s privacy as the user’s identity is transmit-
ted openly to the server via an insecure channel. However,
a user’s privacy should be protected in TMIS to hide the
identity of the patients from unauthorized users. Therefore,
user anonymity is expected to preserve the privacy of patients.
Pu et al. [36] reported an elliptic-curve-cryptosystem-based
strong authentication scheme to ensure user anonymity.
However, this scheme [36] requires high communication,
storage and computation costs. Chen et al. [37] proposed
a dynamic id-based authentication scheme that reduced
costs. Jiang et al. [38] did a thorough cryptanalysis of
Chen et al.’s scheme [37] and observed that the scheme failed
to provide user anonymity. They suggested an authentication
scheme that achieved user anonymity. Kumari et al. [39]
found that Jiang et al.’s scheme is not able to resist
password guessing attacks, user impersonation attacks,
Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks and session key disclo-
sure attacks. Accordingly, they addressed all the limitations
with an improved authentication scheme. Lately, researchers
reported many authentication and key agreement schemes for
TMIS [40], [41], [43], [64].
In the literature, the authentication schemes are either for
a single server environment or a multi-server and cloud-
based environment [2], [4], [9], [82], [83]. Researchers pro-
posed multi-medical-server-based TMIS because a patient
may need access tomultiplemedical servers with a single reg-
istration for different services. In other words, patients may
communicate with different medical servers to get services
from multiple servers such as Anesthesiologist, Cardiologist,
Gastroenterologist, Hematologist, Neurologist, etc. There-
fore, multi-server-based TMIS essentially need a remote
authentication scheme and a key sharing protocol for a secure
message communication. There are several three-factor-
based authentication schemes [1], [45]–[48] for a multi-
server environment using knowledge (e.g. the password),
token (e.g. the smart card) and biometric (e.g. the fingerprint,
iris, face, etc.). Chuang and Chen [1] proposed an authentica-
tion scheme for a multi-server environment. Mishra et al. [48]
and Lin et al. [60] observed that the scheme [1] was vulnera-
ble to insider attacks, Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, server
spoofing attacks and user impersonation attacks. Moreover,
user anonymity property was not provided in the Chuang-
Chen’s scheme. As an improvement, Mishra et al. [48]
designed another authentication scheme for expert systems.
However, Lu et al. [61] and Wang et al. [68] revisited
Mishra et al.’s scheme [48] and found that user anonymity
and perfect forward secrecy of the session key were not pro-
vided in the scheme. Moreover, Mishra et al.’s scheme failed
to resist replay attacks, forgery attacks, Denial-of-Service
(DoS) attacks, user and server masquerading attacks. In 2016,
Reddy et al. [62] analyzed Lu et al.’s scheme [61] and
observed several drawbacks like user impersonation attacks,
Man-in-the-middle attacks and clock synchronization prob-
lems. Also, the perfect forward secrecy and user anonymity
are not ensured in the scheme. In 2016, Wang et al. [68]
proposed an authentication scheme with low computation
cost. In addition, this scheme alleviated different security
issues of Mishra et al. scheme and they included a user
revocation phase in [68]. Unfortunately, Wang et al.’s scheme
failed to resist different known attacks. Irshad et al. [66]
and Reddy et al. [65] identified many drawbacks like insider
attacks, the lack of user anonymity and mutual authentica-
tion in the scheme of [68]. Reddy et al. [65] proposed a
multi-server authentication scheme to resist impersonation
attacks. Irshad et al. [66] proposed an improved and light-
weight authentication scheme to address the impersonation
attacks, user traceability attacks, privileged insider attacks of
Wang et al.’s scheme [68]. However, Irshad et al. [66] do not
include the biometric template update phase in their scheme.
In addition, user revocation and re-registration provisions
were not considered. Later on, Yang and Zheng [69] proposed
an authentication scheme for expert systems and remote dis-
tributed networks, addressing the drawbacks of Wang et al.
scheme. However, this scheme does not consider the biomet-
ric template revocation option. Recently, Barman et al. [78]
proposed an authentication scheme using fuzzy commit-
ment for a multi-server environment. Still, the smart card
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revocation process did not consider any checking of user
authentication before issuing a new smart card to a user. Also,
if an attacker (i.e. insider attacker) knows the user id of a
genuine user, he/she can request for a new smart card from the
registration center. An attacker can generate a template from
his/her biometrics data and he/she can compute the request
message using his/her biometric template, password and ran-
dom number. The registration center cannot differentiate the
genuine request message from attacker’s one. This limitation
is addressed in our proposed scheme.
Amin and Biswas [49] proposed a multi-medical-server-
based TMIS and claimed that their scheme is able to
resist different know attacks. However, Das et al. [50]
thoroughly analyzed the Amin-Biswas’s scheme and found
that the scheme [49] failed to protect privileged insider
attacks, strong replay attacks and man-in-the-middle attacks.
Truong et al. [63] proposed an elliptic-curve-cryptosystem-
based authentication for a multi-server environment with the
provable identity. However, Zhao et al. [70] identified the
offline password guessing attacks, user and server imperson-
ation attacks in the Troung et al.’s scheme [63]. Moreover,
existing remote authentication protocols for a multi-server
environment do not consider (1) the privacy of the biometric
identity of a patient, (2) the diversification of the biomet-
ric template for revocability, (3) the provision of the biometric
template update if required, and (4) error correction from a
biometric template.
In this paper, the fuzzy commitment scheme is used to
design a remote authentication and key agreement protocol
for a TMIS with multi-medical servers. We consider the
privacy of the identity and the diversification of the bio-
metric data. The erroneous template can be corrected and
the enrolled template can be updated successfully in the
proposed scheme. Our proposed scheme also employs only
exclusive-OR operations and one-way hash functions to opti-
mize its computation cost. Moreover, the mutual authenti-
cation between a user and a server is proved using BAN
logic [53]. The Real-Or-Random (ROR) model is used to test
the security of the proposed scheme. Furthermore, informal
security analysis is also applied to our proposed scheme to
ensure the security against some known attacks. The AVISPA
tool is used to simulate and test the formal security of the
proposed scheme. Finally, we discuss the performance of
our scheme with respect to computation and communication
costs, and security functions. The performance of our scheme
is compared with the existing ones, showing that our scheme
requires less computation cost.
A. THE THREAT MODEL
We assume that the Dolev-Yao threat (DY) model [12] and
CK-adversary model [73] are applicable in our scheme as the
de facto standard threat model and adversary model, respec-
tively. As per the DY model, an adversaryA can intercept all
messages communicated between the genuine participants,
modify the content of the messages or intentionally tamper
the messages and delete either the total or a part of the
messages communicated between the genuine participants.
A can even inject his/her own message to compromise
the integrity of the communicated messages. Moreover,
the power analysis attacks [10], [11] may reveal the infor-
mation from a smart card. In addition, an adversary A can
compute some temporary or long-term secrets of the com-
municating participants as per the Canetti and Krawczyk’s
adversary model (CK-adversary model) [73]. Therefore, A
should not able to compromise the security of a remote
authentication and key establishment scheme even when the
ephemeral secrets (temporary or long-term secrets) and the
old session keys are compromised during the communication.
B. RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS
The contributions of this paper are as follows:
• Designing an authentication protocol for multi-medical-
server-based e-Healthcare using fuzzy commitment
scheme. Recently, Barman et al. [78] proposed a
remote authentication scheme using fuzzy commitment.
However, Barman et al.’s scheme is vulnerable to insider
attacks. An insider A trusted by the MSRC knows the
user id IDi, generates biometric template CTA using
his/her own biometric data, BIOMA, selects a random
number kA and generates RPWA = h(PWA||CTA ). The
attackerA then sends the smart card revocationmessage,
<IDi,RPWA⊕ kA> to the registration center. The reg-
istration center will issue a new smart card to the attacker
as the registration center does not have any scope to
check the authenticity of the revocation message. In our
proposed protocol, this problem of the scheme [78] is
addressed. Our proposed scheme provides a secure smart
card revocation phase.
The session key security is ensured under the
CK-adversary model (I-A). Moreover, our scheme con-
siders error correction to remove the noise from a user’s
biometric data. The privacy and identity of the biometric
data are strongly preserved. The diversification of the
biometric template is provided in such a way that it is
easy to revoke a biometric template, if required.
• The proposed scheme is tested with the widely
accepted Real-Or-Random (ROR) model, BAN logic
and AVISPA tool.
• The proposed scheme is compared with the existing
schemes and the proposed scheme is found as the most
efficient scheme with respect to the cost and security
functions.
C. ORGANIZATION
In Section 2, we discuss the definition and mathematical
preliminaries of the fuzzy commitment scheme, error correc-
tion techniques and revocable template generation, which are
essential for describing our proposed scheme. The proposed
protocol is presented in Section 3. In Section 4, we provide
the ROR model, BAN logic and AVISPA simulation for the
formal security analysis of the proposed scheme. In Section 5,
we discuss the informal security analysis for different known
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attacks and compare our proposed protocol with other exist-
ing schemes. The performance of the proposed scheme is
discussed and compared with other schemes in Section 6.
Finally, we conclude the work in Section 7.
II. DEFINITIONS AND MATHEMATICAL PRELIMINARIES
We propose a biometric-based fuzzy commitment scheme
and a one-way hash function. In the fuzzy commitment
scheme, we use a cancelable biometric template and an error
correction technique. In this section, we briefly describe the
basic concepts of cancelable biometric template generation,
one-way hash functions, error correction coding technique
and a fuzzy commitment scheme.
A. THE CANCELABLE BIOMETRIC TEMPLATE
GENERATION FUNCTION
The cancelable biometric template provides privacy to the
original biometric data [19]. The cancelable biometric tem-
plate is generated using a transformation function (say f (.)),
which is irreversible in nature. The transformation function
uses a transformation key (say Tpi ) to convert the biomet-
ric data (say BIOMi) into a cancelable biometric template
(say CTi ), that is, CTi = f (BIOMi,Tpi ). Note that multiple
numbers of irreversible templates may be generated from a
single biometric using multiple transformation parameters.
Moreover, a cancelable transformation process should satisfy
the following properties.
(i) A collision-free cancelable template: (a) Say, CTi , C
′
Ti
are two templates generated from a biometric data BIOMi
using two different transformation parameters, Tpi and T
′
pi ,
respectively. According to this property, CTi 6= C ′Ti when
Tpi 6= T ′pi . (b) Again, if CTk = f (BIOMk ,Tpk ) and CTl =
f (BIOMl,Tpl ), due to the inter-person variability of biomet-
ric data (i.e. BIOMk 6= BIOMl), CTk 6= CTl even when
Tpk = Tpl .
(ii) Intra-user variability: Suppose we use two instances
of a biometric to generate two cancelable templates, CTi =
f (BIOMi,Tp) and C ′Ti = f (BIOM ′i ,Tp). If the similarity
between two sets of biometric data is greater than a threshold
value, say, δ, the similarity between two cancelable templates
should also be greater than δ. Assume that the function of
matching score computation is MS(). Then, if the similarity
score between the biometric instances is greater than δ, that
is, MS(BIOMi,BIOM ′i ) > δ, the similarity between the
templates is also greater than the threshold value δ, that is,
MS(CTi ,C
′
Ti ) > δ.
(iii) The reusability of biometric data: The biometric
template should be easy to revoke if required. An exist-
ing template can be cancelled and a new cancelable biometric
template can be generated from the same biometric data using
the same transformation function but with a new transforma-
tion key. Therefore, the biometric data is reusable even when
a cancelable template is compromised.
B. THE ERROR CORRECTION CODING TECHNIQUE
The errors between two instances of a biometric signal
result in the false rejection of genuine users. These errors
can be corrected using error correction coding (ECC) tech-
niques [7], [8]. Say, there are two instances BIOMenrol and
BIOMquery of a biometric signal. BIOMenrol is captured and
used at the time of the enrollment. A cancelable template
CTenrol is generated for the enrollment from BIOMenrol , that
is, CTenrol = f (BIOMenrol,TPi ). Similarly, another cance-
lable template CTquery is generated from BIOMquery, that is,
CTquery = f (BIOMquery,TPi )). Here, the bitwise dissimilarity
of two templates, that is, e = CTenrol ⊕ CTquery is called
an error. An error correction coding technique (say, 9) can
correct the error e only when the size of e is less than the
capacity of the ECC techniques. There are mainly two steps
in any ECC technique, encoding (9enc) and decoding (9dec).
An error correction codeword is generated and used to encode
a secret string [6], [7]. The encoded string may be transmitted
over network channel and few bits may be integrated with
the original signal and generate an erroneous message for
the recipient. The recipient receives the erroneous message
and removes the errors using decoding of the ECC technique.
Therefore, the error may be corrected completely if the num-
ber of erroneous bits is not more than the error correction
capacity of the ECC technique.
C. THE FUZZY COMMITMENT SCHEME
This scheme is used to conceal a secret under the security of
a witness. The secret can be unlocked using a witness, which
is sufficiently close to the witness used during the enroll-
ment. It was initially proposed by Juels and Wattenberg [5]
in 1999. This scheme is successfully followed to construct
a cryptographic system using the biometric data [6]. In this
scheme, say Kr is a randomly generated key and the Kr is
encoded with a codeword, that is, KCW = 9enc(Kr ). The
KCW is called a pseudo code, which looks like an original
biometric code. A biometric code is a binary string (CTi ),
extracted from a biometric imprint. This biometric code is
also called a cancelable biometric template. A pseudo code
KCW is locked by a cancelable biometric template CTi using
bit-wise exclusive-OR operation, that is, LTKi = CTi ⊕KCW .
Here, LTKi is called helper data as it helps to release the secret
key. The genuine biometric template is applied to extract the
secret key from the helper data. In the fuzzy commitment
scheme, the biometric template and the random secret, both
are deleted carefully. However, the system stores the helper
date HTKi and (h(Kr )) for future use. According to the said
scheme, a genuine biometric template with minimum dissim-
ilarity can decode the secret exactly. The h(Kr ) is used for the
verification of the similarity of the regenerated key K ′r from
LTKi using C ′Ti .
In the key regeneration process, a newly generated biomet-
ric template (say C ′Ti ) is XORed with the helper data LTKi,
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that is,
K ′CW = LTKi ⊕ C ′Ti
= CTi ⊕ KCW ⊕ C ′Ti
= KCW ⊕ e (1)
Due to the intra-person variability, there must be some
errors inC ′Ti , that is, e = C ′Ti⊕CTi . This error is propagated to
K ′CW and can be corrected with the help of the decode phase
of the error correction technique (i.e. Kr = 9dec(K ′CW )).
As the error of the intra-person variability is lower than the
capacity of the error correction of 9, therefore, a genuine
patient can unlock a key correctly using her fresh biometric
instance. The high inter-person variability creates the error
in the impostor template (with respect to a genuine template)
and that is higher than the error correction capacity of 9.
D. ONE-WAY CRYPTOGRAPHIC HASH FUNCTION
A one-way hash function is a mapping function h : A ← B
which takes an arbitrary length message A = {0, 1}∗ as input
and outputs a fixed-length (say l-bits) compressed message
B = {0, 1}l with the following properties:
• Say, an input m ∈ A and the output is y = h(m), y ∈ B.
For any h(.), it is easy to compute y ofm but it is difficult
to recompute the m from the y.
• Any changes (say in a single bit of m) in input results in
a completely uncorrelated hash value which is different
from hash value h(m) before changes.
• Preimage resistance: For an one-way hash function h(.),
the computation of the original message from a given
message digest (hash value) is computationally infeasi-
ble, that is, m 6= h−1(y).
• Second preimage resistance: It is difficult to find two
messages, m,m′ ∈ A such that m 6= m′, but both inputs
produce the same outputs, that is, h(m) = h(m′).
• Strong collision resistance: For two different inputs m,
m′ ∈ A, the hash values are y = h(m) and y′ = h(m′).
If m 6= m′ but y = y′, it is called the collision of a cryp-
tographic one-way hash function. However, the collision
resistance property of a hash function states that for any
two different inputs (m,m′ ∈ A and m 6= m′), a hash
function h(.) never outputs the same message digests.
E. SMART CARD
A smart card is a device that includes an embedded integrated
circuit (i.e. secure micro controller or equivalent intelligence)
with internal memory. A smart card connects to a smart
card reader with a direct physical contact or with a remote
contactless radio frequency interface. Smart cards provide
secure storage of personal data, biometric data security and
mechanisms like encryption, authentication, communication.
They interact intelligentlywith a smart card reader. Generally,
the smart card technology conforms to international standards
(ISO/IEC 7816 and ISO/IEC 14443). We have considered the
physical contact smart card with the embedded circuit to store
the confidential information of the registered patients and
the smart card can process the data for authentication of the
registered patients. The smart card can generate and send the
login message to the server to establish a secure connection
between a registered patient and medical server.
III. THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL
This section includes three procedures: registration of the
server and the patient, the session key establishment protocol,
and the update phase. In our discussion, we have used several
symbols and notations which are given in Table 1.
TABLE 1. Notations.
In our proposed scheme, initially, the medical servers and
the patients are enrolled with medical service registration
center. User authentication is verified by the smart card and
only the authentic patients can log into the system. The
medical server also checks the authenticity of the patient with
respect to the received login message. The medical server
transmits a reply-message to the patient after verification of
authentication. Then, the patient checks the authenticity of
the medical server based on the received message. Finally,
the same session key is computed by the patient and the
medical server. In the update phase, a patient can update
his/her password, biometric template and smart card.
We apply the fuzzy commitment scheme in order to
strengthen our scheme. The error correction technique is
adopted along with the fuzzy commitment scheme to handle
the noisy biometric signal. Furthermore, we use the time-
stamp and the random nonce to make our scheme resilient
to the replay and man-in-the-middle attacks.
The details of the different phases are discussed in the
following subsections.
A. THE REGISTRATION PROCEDURE
In this proposed scheme, all the medical servers and patients
are enrolled to the telecare medical system through the
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FIGURE 1. The medical server and patients registration procedure. (a) Server registration process. (b) User registration process.
medical service registration center (MSRC). Both registration
procedures are presented in the Figure 1.
1) THE SERVER REGISTRATION PROCEDURE
In our scheme, all medical servers (MSj, j = 1 to (m+m′)) are
required to be registered with the medical service registration
center (MSRC). We assume that initially m medical servers
are ready to be registered. We also assume that another m′
medical servers may be registered in the future. A medical
server chooses its unique id, that is, SIDj and sends it to
theMSRC for the registration. The registration centerMSRC
computes a server specific key Xj = h(SIDj||KRC ), where
KRC to be the secret key of MSRC . Then, MSRC sends Xj
to MSj. This Xj is used during the authentication process
of a patient. The MSRC repeats the same process for m
number of the medical server registrations. At the same time,
the MSRC assumes that m′ number of medical servers may
register themselves with the MSRC in the future. Therefore,
the MSRC chooses a unique medical server id SIDk for
m + 1 ≤ k ≤ m + m′ and computes the shared key Xk
for m + 1 ≤ k ≤ m + m′. The medical server ids and the
corresponding keys are stored in the database of the MSRC .
In the future, if any medical server requests for registration,
the MSRC provides them with an unused unique id and a
corresponding key from the database.
2) THE PATIENT REGISTRATION PROCESS
Initially, every patient should register to the medical service
registration center (MSRC) via a secure channel. Each patient
(say Ui) chooses a user id (UIDi), a password (PWi) and
a transformation key (TPi ). The patient Ui imprints his/her
biometric data (BIOMi) through a biometric scanner.We have
used the fingerprint biometric in our approach. This biometric
has been chosen because it is universal, unique and invariant
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over time. More significantly, it is processable in real-time
with almost near 100% accuracy. In this work, minutiae-
based approach has been followed. The minutiae points
are extracted from a fingerprint image using the publicly
available NIST Biometric Software (NBIS). The MINDTCT
module of NBIS is used as a minutiae detector to extract
minutiae points (i.e. ridge ending and ridge bifurcation) from
fingerprint image. A set of minutiae points (say, BIOMi)
captured from the fingerprint image of a user is used to
generate the cancelable template (i.e. CTi ) with a transfor-
mation parameter (TPi ) using a transformation function f (.).
This canelable template is used in the implementation of the
proposed authentication protocol. The detailed steps of the
patient registration procedure are described as follows.
1) The patient generates a cancelable templates, that is,
CTi = f (BIOMi,TPi ).
2) Ui selects a key K randomly and encodes K into a
codeword, KCW uses the error correction encoding
technique 9enc, that is, KCW = 9enc(K ).
3) Ui locks KCW with the cancelable biometric template
CTi (i.e. LTKi = KCW ⊕ CTi ).
4) Ui computes PWDi = h(UIDi||K ||PWi) and sends
(UIDi,PWDi) along with a registration request to the
MSRC .
5) After receiving the registration request from a patient,
the MSRC computes Aj = h(UIDi||Xj) ⊕ PWDi and
Pj = h(SIDj||Xj)⊕ PWDi for 1 ≤ j ≤ m+ m′.
6) The MSRC stores all authentication parameters
{<SIDj,Aj,Pj>|1 ≤ j ≤ m+m′), h(.)} in a smart card,
SCi. Then, the SCi is delivered to patient Ui through a
secure channel. The MSRC stores UIDi, h(PWDi||Xj)
in the database for future use.
7) Ui computes fi = h(UIDi||PWDi||CTi ) and stores {TPi ,
LTKi, h(K ), fi, f (.), 9enc(), 9dec()} into SCi.
Finally, the smart card SCi contains {<SIDj, Aj, Pj> |1 ≤
j ≤ m + m′), h(.), TPi , LTKi, h(K ), fi, f (.), 9enc(.), 9dec(.)}.
Therefore, the biometric data of the users/patients need not
to be directly stored anywhere in the system. In the proposed
approach, the cancelable fingerprint template of a user CTi
is used to lock a randomly generated key K and the locked
key/template (i.e. helper data, LTKi) is to be stored in the
internal memory of the respective user’s smart card.
B. THE SESSION KEY ESTABLISHMENT PROTOCOL
This procedure includes the login phase, the mutual authen-
tication phase and the agreement protocol.
1) THE LOGIN PHASE
Any registered patient Ui can access any registered med-
ical server MSj after a successful authentication. Initially,
a registered patient inserts SCi to a smart card reader (SCR),
captures biometric imprint, enters UIDi and PWi to access
a desired medical server. In the login phase, SCi verifies the
authenticity of the patientUi. The smart card generates a valid
login message only when the patient passes the authentica-
TABLE 2. The login process.
tion checking through the password, the biometric and the
smart card. Detailed steps are described below and illustrated
in Table 2.
1) Ui inserts the SCi to a SCR and inputs UIDi, PWi and
scans his/her biometric to capture a query BIOM∗i .
2) SCi computes a cancelable template C∗Ti from query
BIOM∗i using transformation function f () and transfor-
mation parameter TPi , that is, C
∗
Ti = f (BIOM∗i ,TPi ).
3) SCi unlocks K∗CW with C∗Ti and decodes it to regenerate
the key K∗ as follows: K∗ = 9dec(LTKi ⊕ C∗Ti ) =
9dec(K∗CW )
4) SCi checks h(K∗)? = h(K ) and if it is wrong, it rejects
the session immediately. Otherwise it continues.
5) SCi computes: PWD∗i = h(UIDi||K∗||PWi), f ∗i =
h(UIDi||PWD∗i ||C∗Ti ). Then, SCi checks f ∗i ? = fi. If it
does not hold, the login process is terminated. Other-
wise,Ui passed all the login check points. SCi generates
a random number Rc and a time stamp TS1.
6) SCi computes the following messages
M1 = Aj ⊕ PWD∗i = h(UIDi||Xj)
M2 = Pj ⊕ PWD∗i = h(SIDj||Xj)
M3 = UIDi ⊕M2
M4 = M1 ⊕ Rc
M5 = h(M1||Rc||TS1)
7) The smart card SCi sends the login message
<M3,M4,M5,TS1> to the medical server MSj.
2) THE MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION AND
KEY AGREEMENT PHASE
A legal patient and a registered server are mutually authen-
ticated to each other before the agreement of a session key.
The medical server checks the login messages of the patient
and authenticates the patient. Similarly, the patient checks the
authenticity of the server to achieve mutual authentication.
Then, a session key is established between them for future
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TABLE 3. The mutual authentication and key agreement protocol.
secure message communication. This process is illustrated
in Table 3. The detailed steps are described below.
1) The medical server MSj receives the login message
from the patient/the smart card SCi at time TSc and
checks the validity of the time stamp (TS1) with respect
to a predefined threshold delay 1T . If (TSc − TS1) ≤
1T holds then continues, otherwiseMSj terminates the
session.
2) The MSj computes the parameters as follows:
M6 = h(SIDj||Xj)
M7 = M3 ⊕M6 = UIDi
M8 = h(M7||Xj) = h(UIDi||Xj)
M9 = M4 ⊕M8 = Rc
M10 = h(M8||M9||TS1)
= h(h(IDi||Xj)||Rc||TS1)
3) MSj compares M10 with received M5. If M5 = M10
holds, it generates a random number Rs and the current
time stamp TS2.
4) Then, MSj computes the following parameters:







5) MSj sends<SIDj,M11,M12,TS2> to the patientUi/the
smart card SCi.
6) SCi receives the message at time TSc1, checks the time
delay (i.e. (TSc1 − TS2) and if it is less than 1T ,
it computes the following:
M13 = M11 ⊕ h(M1||Rc)
SKij = h(M1||M2||Rc||M13||TS2)
M14 = h(SKij||M1||Rc||TS2)
7) SCi comparesM12 withM14 and ifM12 = M14, the ses-
sion key SKij is generated correctly at the patient’s site.
8) SCi generates a time stamp TS3 and computes M15 =
h(SKij||M1||M13||TS3) and sends <M15,TS3> to the
medical server MSj for further checking of the right
session key.
9) After receiving the message<M15,TS3> at time TSc3,
the server computes M16 = h(SKij|| M8||Rs||TS3) if
(TSc3 − TS3 < 1T ).
10) MSj comparesM16 withM15. IfM16 = M15, the session
key is shared between Ui and MSj successfully. Now,
the medical server MSj may send a message to the
patient Ui through the session key SKij.
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C. THE UPDATE PHASE
1) THE PASSWORD CHANGE PHASE
A patient Ui may require to update his/her password.
Password change phase requires a successful login of the
patient. In our proposed scheme, the registration center
MSRC is not to be involved in the password change phase.
A patient can update his/her password locally. The detailed
steps of the password changing process, are as follows.
1) Ui inputs (UIDi,PWi) and scans the biometric to
extract BIOMi and inserts the SCi to SCR for successful
login.
2) If Ui fails to log in, the password update process is
terminated by the SCi. Otherwise, the SCi asks Ui for
new password.
3) The Ui enters a new password PW newi .
4) SCi computes PWDnewi = h(UIDi||K ||PW newi ) and






Anewj = Aj ⊕ PWDi ⊕ PWDnewi
Pnewj = Pj ⊕ PWDi ⊕ PWDnewi
f newi = h(UIDi||PWDnewi ||CTi )




2) THE BIOMETRIC TEMPLATE REVOCATION PHASE
In any biometric based security system, the biometric tem-
plate is required to be updated for better security of the
system. The biometric template update procedure is described
in the following.
1) The patient Ui captures a new instance of a biometric
image through scanner and extracts the unique features
from the newly captured biometric image. Say, the fea-
ture set is represented by BIOM∗i .
2) The Ui provides UIDi,PWi along with BIOM∗i to the
terminals and inserts the SCi to the SCR for successful
login.
3) The SCi computes C ′Ti from BIOM
∗
i using f (.) and TPi .
4) After successful login, the patient Ui provides a new
transformation parameter T newPi to the SCi.
5) The SCi computes the following: CnewTi = f (BIOM∗i ,
T newPi ), LTK
new
i = LTKi ⊕ C ′Ti ⊕ CnewTi , f newi =
h(UIDi||PWDi||CnewTi ).




3) THE SMART CARD REVOCATION PHASE
A patient may need to revoke his/her smart card. The pro-
posed scheme allows the genuine patient to revoke his/her
smart card after the verification of the patient’s authentica-
tion. In this case, the patient sends a request for a new smart
card to the MSRC, which checks the message of the patient
before issuing a new smart card.
• A patient enters the user id UIDi, password PWi,
imprints his/her biometric BIOM ′i and scans the smart
card SCi through the smart card reader. The SCi gener-
ates C ′Ti from the BIOM
′
i and computes (K
∗, PWD′i, f ∗i ).
• If h(K∗) = h(K ) and f ∗i = fi, the patient sends
UIDi,PWD′i to the MSRC for a new smart card.
• The MSRC checks the database for the corresponding
UIDi. If h(PWD′i||Xj) = h(PWDi||Xj), the MSRC stores
SIDj, Aj = h(UIDi||Xj) ⊕ PWDi, Pj = h(SIDj||Xj) ⊕
PWDi for j = 1 to m + m′ into the memory of a new
smart card SCnewi . Then, the SC
new
i is delivered to the
patient Ui through a secure channel.
• Ui computes fi = h(UIDi||PWD′i||CTi ) and stores {TPi ,
LTKi, h(K ), fi, f (.), 9enc(), 9dec()} into SCi.
IV. FORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, the formal security of the proposed scheme
is tested using the ROR model, BAN logic and AVISPA tool
simulation.
A. VERIFICATION OF SESSION KEY SECURITY
The ROR model [73], [74] is widely used in the existing
authentication-based key agreement protocols [72], [75]–[77]
to verify the security of a session-key (SK). The proposed
scheme is also applied the ROR model to proof the security
of session key.
1) THE ROR MODEL
In our scheme, the participants are the patient Ui and the
medical server MSj. The principal components of the ROR
model related to our scheme are given below.
Participants. IuUi and IsMSj are the oracles to represent the
instances u and s of Ui and MSj, respectively.
Accepted state. Assuming that the final message is
received by an instance I t and it enters in an accept state.
Then, we call I t is an accepted state. Now, all the commu-
nication messages (the send and received messages) by the
accepted state I t are arranged in order and it forms the session
identification (sid) for I t of the current session.
Partnering. Two instances Iu and Is are known as the
partners to each other if they satisfy following three condi-
tions concurrently : 1) both are in accepted state, 2) both share
the same sid and they can mutually authenticate each other,
and 3) Iu and Is must be mutual partners of each other.
Freshness. The participant IuUi or IsMSj is fresh only when
the reveal oracle Reveal is not able to leak the session key
SKij established between the patient Ui and the server MSj.
Adversary. According to Dolev-Yao (DY) threat model,
an adversary A is capable to intercept, modify and delete
few or all messages communicated between the participants.
Moreover, CK-adversary model states that an adversary can
inject an error to the communicatedmessages. In RORmodel,
the adversary may execute the following queries:
Execute(Iu, Is): In ROR model, the adversary A uses this
query to read the intercepted messages during the communi-
cation between Ui and MSj.
Send(I t ,M ): A can send and receive a message to and
from I t by executing this active attack.
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Reveal(I t ): . The attackerA uses Reveal query to leak the
session key SKij established between I t and its partner in the
current session.
CorruptSmartCard(IuUi ): Assume that the smart card SCi is
with an attackerA. An attacker can apply the power analysis
attack [10], [11] A on SCi and can reveal all the secret
information from SCi.
Test(I t ): An unbiased coin is flipped in this query and
its output is used as a decider for the game. Say, A exe-
cutes Test(I t ) query. For a fresh session key SKij established
between Ui and MSj, I t returns the session key if c = 1 or it
returns a random number if c = 0. Otherwise, a null value
(⊥) is returned.
A can execute CorruptSmartCard(IuUi ) queries for a lim-
ited number of times. However, there is no restriction for A
on the execution of Test(I t ) queries.
Random oracle. We model the hash function h(·) as a
random oracle, say H. We assume that the h(·) is publicly
available.
Definition 1 (Semantic Security): According to the seman-
tic security, the session key SKij is not distinguishable from
a random number. A executes Test(I t ) query and check the
consistency of the guessed bit c′ against the bit c of the session
key. Assume that the probability of winning the game byA is
Succ. The advantage ofA to break the security of SKij of our
proposed scheme, say denoted by P in a polynomial time t is
defined by AdvAP (t) = |2.Pr[Succ]−1| = |2.Pr[c′ = c]−1|,
where Pr[Xi] is the probability of an event Xi.
Definition 2: The proposed protocol is denoted as P and it
is semantically secure if AdvAP is only negligibly larger than
max{C ′.qs′s , qs( 12lb , εbm)}whereC ′, s′, qs, lb, εbm denote their
usual meanings as tabulated in Table 4.
TABLE 4. Symbols used in the real-or-random (ROR) model.
2) SECURITY PROOF
The session key security proof is provided in Theorem 1.
We have considered the Zipf’s law for the attack of password
guessing [79]. In this case, when we consider only trawling
guessing attacks, advantage of an adversary will be over
0.5 for qs = 107 or108 [79], [80]. The advantage of an
adversary for targeted guessing attack using user’s personal
information will be over 0.5 for qs ≤ 106 [85].
Theorem 1: Let the advantage of a polynomial-time
t-adversary A to break the semantic security of the proposed
scheme P be denoted as AdvAP (t). Then,
AdvAP (t) ≤
q2H + 16 qH
2lH
+ (qs + qe)
2 + 6qs
2lr




where the meaning of all symbols are given in Table 4.
Proof: The proof is similar to that as presented in
[72], [77], [78], and [81]. In this proof, we need four games,
namely,Gm0,Gm1,Gm2,Gm3, andGm4. We denote the suc-
cess of an adversary A as SuccAGmj when A win the game
Gmj, where j = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4. At the same time, advantage
of A for winning Gmj is denoted and defined by AdvAGmj =
Pr[SuccAGmj ].
• Game Gm0: This game is the actual attack by A to our
schemeP . The game begins whenA chooses bit c. Since
the game Gm0 and the actual protocol P are basically
identical to each other, therefore by definition we have,
AdvAP (t) = |2.AdvAGm0 − 1|. (2)
• Game Gm1: In this game,A executes the eavesdropping
attack by calling the Execute query. After that, A exe-
cutes the Test query once the game is completed. The
output of this query is the decider to distinguish the SKij
from any random number. According to the formation
of the session key,A needs the long-term secrets (UIDi,
SIDj and Xj) and the short-term secrets (Rc,Rs), to com-
pute the session key accurately. Otherwise, the chance
of winning the game Gm1 is not increased even all the
messages Msg1, Msg2 and Msg3 are intercepted. Here,
Gm0 and Gm1 are essentially indistinguishable. There-
fore, we have the following:
AdvAGm1 = AdvAGm0 . (3)
• Game Gm2: This is an active attack. The Send and H
queries are implemented in this game. The attacker A
intercepts all the messages Msg1 = 〈M3,M4,M5,TS1〉
andMsg2 = 〈M11,M12,TS2〉,A, andMsg3 =M15,TS3.
A uses the intercepted messages for deriving the session
key SKij. It is found thatMsg1 andMsg2 involve the ran-
dom nonces Rc and Rs. The current time stamps TS1, TS2
and TS3 are also involved in the messages Msg1,Msg2
andMsg3, respectively. Hence, random nonces and cur-
rent time stamps prevent collision in the messages of
different session.
Therefore, the gameGm2 is identical with the gameGm1
without the involvement of the Send and H queries.
Then, we have the following result:








• Game Gm3: In this game,A executes Send(MSj,Msg1),
Send(Ui,Msg2) and Send(MSj,Msg3) queries to win the





. Accordingly, due to transcript of
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three messages, collision probability is up to 3qs2lr
. As a
whole, we get,






• Game Gm4: The adversary A plays this game to
simulate the CorruptSmartCard query and extracts
the secret credentials {<SIDj,Aj,Pj>|1 ≤ j ≤
m + m′), h(.),TPi ,LTKi, h(K ), fi, f (.), 9enc(.), 9dec(.)}
stored into SCi, where LTKi = KCW ⊕ CTi , fi =
h(UIDi||PWDi||CTi ), Aj = h(UIDi||Xj) ⊕ PWDi, Pj =
h(SIDj||Xj) ⊕ PWDi for 1 ≤ j ≤ (m + m′). The
adversary is not able to extract the biometric template
CTi and the password PWi of the user id UIDi. The
maximum probability to guess the biometric template is
upto max{qs( 12lb , εbm)} [81]. The guessing of password
has a probability upto C ′.qs′s [79]. Therefore, the game
Gm4 and Gm3 are identical without the guessing attacks
on biometric and password. Overall, we have,












Using Eqs. (2), (3) and (6), we get
AdvAP (t) = 2|AdvAGm0 − 1|
= 2|AdvAGm1 − 1|
= 2|AdvAGm1 − AdvAGm4 |. (8)
Applying the triangular inequality, we get
|AdvAGm1 − AdvAGm4 | ≤ |AdvAGm1 − AdvAGm2 |
+ |AdvAGm2 − AdvAGm4 |
≤ |AdvAGm1 − AdvAGm2 |
+ |AdvAGm2 − AdvAGm3 |
+ |AdvAGm3 − AdvAGm4 |. (9)
Finally, from Eq. (2) to (9), we get the required result:
AdvAP (t) ≤
q2H + 16 qH
2lH
+ (qs + qe)
2 + 6qs
2lr




B. THE VERIFICATION OF MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION
WITH BAN LOGIC
Recently, the BAN logic is used to check the mutual
authentication in the existing key agreement protocols
[50], [54], [65]. We have assessed the mutual authentication
between Ui and MSj with BAN logic proof.
1) NOTATIONS
We use different notations in our analysis of the BAN logic.
The notations are given in Table 5.
TABLE 5. Notations used in BAN logic.
2) RULES








Nonce verification rule: P|≡](X ),P|≡Q||X˜P|≡Q|≡X - Rule-2.
Jurisdiction rule: P|≡Q⇒X ,P|≡Q|≡XP|≡X - Rule-3.
Freshness-conjuncatenation rule: P|≡](X )P|≡](X ,Y ) - Rule-4.
Belief rule: P|≡(X ),P|≡(Y )P|≡(X ,Y ) - Rule-5.
3) ASSUMPTIONS
We assume that the following holds at the beginning of every
run of our scheme.
• A1: Ui| ≡ ](Rc), Ui| ≡ ](TS1)
• A2: MSj| ≡ ](Rs), MSj| ≡ ](TS2)
• A3: Ui| ≡ Ui M1←→ MSj
• A4: MSj| ≡ MSj M1←→ Ui
• A5: Ui| ≡ MSj ⇒ Ui
SKij←→ MSj
• A6: MSj| ≡ Ui ⇒ Ui
SKij←→ MSj
4) GOALS
• g1: MSj| ≡ Ui| ≡ Ui
SKij←→ MSj
• g2: MSj| ≡ Ui
SKij←→ MSj
• g3: Ui| ≡ MSj| ≡ Ui
SKij←→ MSj
• g4: Ui| ≡ Ui
SKij←→ MSj
5) THE IDEALIZED FORM OF MESSAGES
The messages are transmitted through a public channel
by either patient Ui or medical server MSj for authen-
tication and key establishment. The messages are given
below.
• Message(1): Ui→ MSj: <M3,M4,M5,TS1>
• Message(2): MSj→ Ui: <M11,M12,TS2>
• Message(3): Ui→ MSj: <M15,TS3>
By combining message 1 and 3, we can write messages as
given below:
• Message(1): Ui → MSj: <M3,M4,M5,TS1>,
<M15,TS3>
• Message(2): MSj→ Ui: <M11,M12,TS2>
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The idealized forms of the messages are given below:
• Message(1): MSj C <M3,M4,M5,TS1>, <M15,
TS3>, that is,
m1: MSj C <UIDi>(SIDj)Xj , <Rc>M1 ,TS3, (SKij,Rs,
TS3)M1
• Message(2): MSj→ Ui: <M11,M12,TS2>, that is,
m2: Ui C <Rs>(Rc)M1 ,TS2, (Ui
SKij←→ MSj, Rc,TS2)M1
6) SCHEME ANALYSIS
1) According to the assumption A3, the message m2
and using the message meaning rule (i.e. Rule-1),
we obtain:Ui|| ≡ MSj||(˜Ui
SKij←→MSj, Rc,TS2) (Say, S1).
2) Using A1 and S1, applying the fresh conjuncatenation
(i.e. Rule-4) and nonce-verification rules (i.e. Rule-2),
we obtain: Ui| ≡ MSj| ≡ (Ui
SKij←→ MSj, Rc,TS2).
(Say S2).
3) By the belief rule (i.e. Rule-5), we obtain the goal (g3):
Ui| ≡ MSj| ≡ Ui
SKij←→ MSj, from S2.
4) Using the assumption A5 and the goal g3, according to
the jurisdiction rule (i.e. Rule-3), we obtain the goal g4:
Ui| ≡ Ui
SKij←→ MSj
5) Considering assumptionA4, the message-meaning rule
(i.e. Rule-1) is applied on the message m1. We obtain
formula S3 as: MSj| ≡ Ui||(˜U
SKij←→
i MSj,Rs,TS3)M1
6) We obtain a statement (S4) using A2, S3, Rule-4 and
Rule-2, that is, S4:MSj| ≡ Ui| ≡ (Ui
SKij←→ MSj, Rs,TS3)
7) Applying the belief rule on S4, we can conclude as
follows: MSj| ≡ Ui| ≡ (Ui
SKij←→ MSj). Therefore, our
goal g1 is proved for our scheme.
8) Considering the truthfulness of the goal g1 and our
assumption A6, according to the jurisdiction rule
(i.e. Rule-3), we obtain MSij| ≡ Ui
SKij←→ MSj, which is
equivalent to our goal g2.
C. FORMAL SECURITY VERIFICATION USING AVISPA
Recently, security of the existing schemes [49], [50], [52],
[67], [76]–[78] is tested using widely accepted AVISPA
tool [58]. Mainly, the OFMC and CL-AtSe back-ends are
used to check the security of the existing schemes. AVISPA
tool executes the simulated protocol specified by HLPSL
language [59]. In the protocol specification, three basic roles
for three participants (i.e. the user role Ui, the medical ser-
vice registration center role MSRC and the medical server
roleMSj) are defined. Accordingly, session role, environment
role and goals are specified in HLPSL.
In our protocol specification in HLPSL language, we have
considered four secrecy goals and five authentication proper-
ties for verification of our scheme. These goals and authenti-
cation properties are described below.
• secrecy_of sub1 : KRC is kept secret to the MSj.
• secrecy_of sub2: PWi and K are kept secret to the Ui.
• secrecy_of sub3: UIDi is kept secret between Ui
and MSj.
• secrecy_of sub4: Xj is kept secret to the MSj.
• authentication_on user_msj_ts1: The server MSj
receives TS1 from the patient Ui and MSj authenticates
Ui based on TS1.
• authentication_on user_msj_rc: The server MSj
authenticates the patient Ui based on Rc received from
the message of the patient Ui.
• authentication_on msj_user_ts2 : The patient Ui
receives TS2 from the message of the server MSj and
Ui authenticates the server MSj based on TS2.
• authentication_on msj_user_rs : The patient Ui also
authenticates the server MSj based on the received Rs
from the server MSj.
• authentication_on user_msj_ts3: The server MSj
authenticates the patient Ui based on TS3 received from
the message of the patient Ui.
FIGURE 2. The Simulation results of security analysis using the proposed
scheme with the AVISPA tool.
The results of AVISPA simulation are given in the Figure 2.
The results contain the verification of security of the proposed
scheme under OFMC and CL-AtSe back-ends models. The
simulation results show that the depth of search is 7 plies
and total number of visited nodes is 100 in OFMC model.
Moreover, OFMC backend needs 0.28 seconds and CL-AtSe
backend takes 0.05 seconds to complete the search for attacks.
The results of the simulation reported in Fig.2 clearly indicate
that the proposed scheme is safe against replay and man-in-
the-middle attacks.
V. INFORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS
The informal security analysis is used in the existing key
agreement schemes [1], [49], [50], [54], [56], [64]–[67], [78].
In this section, we have discussed the security strength of
our proposed scheme against different known attacks. The
security features of other existing schemes are compared with
the proposed scheme.
A. USER ANONYMITY
The user id of a patient is protected under the security of either
the biometric data of the patient (fi = h(UIDi||PWDi||CTi )),
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or the secret key of the medical server (Aj,Pj,M3 = UIDi ⊕
M2 = UIDi ⊕ h(SIDj||Xj)). To know the UIDi from the
data stored in the smart card, an adversary should know the
password PWi and the secret key K of a patientUi. The secret
keyK is locked with the cancelable biometric templateCTi of
Ui. On the other side, only a registered serverMSj knows the
secret key of the server. Therefore, only the genuine server
may compute the user identity. Say, the server Sj knows the
secret key Xj. The message M2 can be generated by MSj as
M2 = h(SIDj||Xj). Therefore, after receiving the message
from patient Ui, the medical server MSj computes patient id
UIDi fromM3 asUIDi = M3⊕M2. However, in [1] and [32],
user anonymity is not satisfied.
B. PRIVILEGED-INSIDER ATTACKS
A patient sends PWDi = h(UIDi||K ||PWi) to the MSRC in
the registration phase. An insider user of the trusted MSRC
may behave like an attacker A and the registration message
of Ui can be recorded by A during registration of the patient
Ui. Furthermore, we assume that A can access all secret
information of SCi. In the proposed scheme, deriving the PWi
from PWDi without exact knowledge of the key K is a hard
problem. Therefore, a privileged insider cannot pretend the
patient Ui to log into the medical server because the attacker
does not know PWi. Whereas, the schemes [2], [47], [49] do
not resist insider attacks.
C. OFF-LINE PASSWORD GUESSING ATTACKS
An attackerAmay target the SCi to obtain the password from
fi = h(UIDi||PWDi||CTi ). However, A needs to know UIDi,
the K , and the CTi to know PWi from fi. Again, it is hard
to know the biometric template CTi , the secret key K and
the user id UIDi of a patient Ui to guess the password PWi
by the A. However, in case of Arshad and Nikooghadam’s
scheme [33], it is possible to guess the password off-line.
D. IMPERSONATION ATTACKS
There are two types of impersonation attacks, namely,
the user and the server impersonation attacks.
• User impersonation attacks: An attacker A may try
to convince a medical server on behalf of a regis-
tered patient Ui. Here, A needs to generate a random
nonce RAc and a current time stamp TSA1 to compute
a login message. Then, A may try to compute M1 =
h(UIDi||Xj),M2 = h(SIDj||Xj),M3 =UIDi⊕M2,M ′4 =
M1 ⊕ RAc , M ′5 = h(M1||RAc ||TSA1 ) in order to generate
a valid login message <M3,M ′4,M ′5,TSA1 >. However,
A needs to know the long-term secrets UIDi, SIDj and
Xj to impersonate a user with a valid login message.
Therefore, the user impersonation attack is prevented in
our proposed scheme.
• Server impersonation attacks: An attacker A may try
to send a message to Ui on behalf of MSj. To com-
pute the response message, A generates a random
nonce RAs , a current time stamp TSA2 and attempts to
compute M11 = h(h(UIDi||Xj)||R′c) ⊕ RAs , M12 =
h(SKij||h(UIDi||Xj)||R′c||TSA2 ) in order to compute a
valid response message. In the proposed scheme,
an attacker A is not capable to compute the message
without the short-term secret credential (Rc) and long-
term credentials (UIDi, SIDj and Xj). It means that our
proposed scheme is protected from the server imperson-
ation attacks.
Some existing schemes [1], [33], [61], [68] are vulnerable to
the impersonation attacks.
E. MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION
The server validates the time stamp TS1 and checks whether
M5 is equal to M10. Any legitimate server can be authenti-
cated by extracting the Rc from the login request message.
On the other hand, only a legal patient can extract the nonce
of the server Rs, that is, the patient is authenticated here.
Similarly, only the genuine server can generate the message
M10 and can extract the nonce Rc of a legal patient. In this
way, the mutual authentication between the patient and the
medical server is achieved in the proposed scheme. However,
some existing schemes [1], [60], [68] are failed to achieve this
security function.
F. REPLAY ATTACKS
The proposed scheme uses the current time stamp and
randomly generated nonce in every session to prevent the
replay attacks. Say, an adversary, A intercepts messages
(<M3,M4,M5,TS1>, <M11,M12,TS2>, <M15,TS3>) of
the login, authentication and key agreement procedures. IfA
replays an old message by resending to the server or the
patient, the server or the patient will detect the attack imme-
diately when the freshness of the time stamps will be ver-
ified. Chuang and Chen’s scheme [1] and Mishra et al.’s
scheme [48] are failed to resist replay attacks.
G. MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE ATTACK PROTECTION
In this attack, an adversary A pretends himself as a medical
server to a patient Ui and as a patient to a medical server
MSj. A intercepts a login message <M3,M4,M5,TS1>
from Ui and attempt to generate another login message,
say <M ′3,M ′4,M ′5,TS
m
1 > for the server MSj. The adver-
sary A computes the Rmc randomly and generates a time
stamp TSm1 to compute a login message. To compute M
′
3 =
UIDi ⊕ h(SIDj||Xj), M ′4 = h(UID||Xj) ⊕ Rmc , M ′5 =
h(h(UID||Xj)||Rmc ||TSm1 ), A needs to know the long-term
secrets UIDi, SIDi and Xj. Moreover, A can not compute
the genuine nonce Rc of Ui without the knowledge about the
long-term secret credential Xj. Hence, the proposed scheme
is able to resist the man-in-the-middle attacks. However,
Lu et al.’s scheme [61] is prone toMan-in-the-Middle attacks.
H. NO ENCRYPTION/DECRYPTION
In our scheme, we do not use any symmetric or
asymmetric encryption but only the cryptographic hash
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function h(.). The cryptographic one way hash function is
irreversible and it demands less execution time with respect
to encryption/decryption algorithms. Therefore, our pro-
posed scheme is efficient. However, Amin and Biswas [49]
in 2015, Chaudhry et al. [64] in 2017, and Irshad et al. [66]
in 2017 used encryption in their schemes.
I. FAST ERROR DETECTION
In the proposed scheme, the SCi of a legal patient Ui verifies
the credentials of a patient. The patient Ui computes C∗Ti =
f (BIOM∗i ,TPi ), K∗ = 9dec(LTKi ⊕ C∗Ti ). If h(K∗) 6= h(K ),
SCi terminates the session in the very beginning of the session
initiation. Therefore, our scheme is able to detect unautho-
rized patients immediately to avoid extra computation and
communication costs. A medical server MSj checks whether
M10 = M5. If it fails the check, the session is terminated
by the server. This way, our scheme achieves the early error
detection property.
J. STOLEN SMART CARD ATTACKS
We assume that a smart card SCi is stolen by an adver-
sary A and he/she can extract all stored information
{<SIDj,Aj,Pj>|1 ≤ j ≤ m + m′), h(.),TPi ,LTKi, h(K ),
fi, f (.), 9enc(.), 9dec(.)} from the SCi using power anal-
ysis attacks [10], [11]. Here, LTKi = KCW ⊕ CTi ,
PWDi = h(UIDi||K ||PWi), Aj = h(UIDi||Xj) ⊕ PWDi,
Pj = h(SIDj||Xj) ⊕ PWDi, for 1 ≤ j ≤ m + m′,
fi = h(UIDi||PWDi||CTi ). Now, the attacker may try to
compute the long-term secret from the extracted information
of the smart card. However, it is a hard problem to reveal any
information from the hash values. Therefore, the smart card
stolen attacks is avoided in our scheme.
K. PHISHING ATTACKS
Phishing is a type of attack in which an authentic user
tries to masquerade any other genuine user to steal his/her
important data. In the proposed approach, if any registered
user attempts to compromise the protocol through a phishing
attack, he/she will not be able to hide his/her identity. Hence,
the impersonation attack is not possible. Furthermore, if an
attacker tries to compute the login message (such as M3, M4,
M5, TSi), he/she needs the complete knowledge of UIDi, K,
PWi, Aj, Pj. In fact, for an attacker without the necessary
knowledge, it is impossible to compute a valid login message
of a registered patient. Any invalid message will be detected
at the server side and the login request will be rejected.
Therefore, the server will not send any information to the
attacker without proper authentication.
L. MAN-AT-THE-END ATTACKS
Man-at-the-end (MATE) attacks can take place in several
forms if the adversary has physical and authorized access
to the attack target. Suppose the adversary has access to
the smart card, the data in the smart card is still protected
in the sense that it needs the genuine biometric data and
other credentials like the password to retrieve the information
of the smart card owner. We further assume that with the
sufficient expertise and skills, the adversary may compro-
mise all the information stored in the card. Side channel
attacks and power analysis attacks can help the adversary to
reveal the information stored in a smart card. Nevertheless,
the adversary will not be able to extract user’s biometric,
key and password from (SIDj,Aj,Pj,TPi,LTKi, h(K )). Only
the genuine cancelable template of the smart card owner
can unlock the secret key K from LTKi. Hence, the pro-
posed approach is secured against MATE. Moreover, if an
attacker accesses the database of a medical server where
h(PWDi||KRC ) and patient’s ID UIDi is stored, then from
this information, the adversary will not be able to retrieve
anything to compromise the actual information.
M. EASY BIOMETRIC TEMPLATE REVOCATION
In this scheme, the biometric data of the patient is easy to
revoke if required. The transformation parameter needs to be
changed to generate a new cancelable biometric template.
The patient can randomly choose a new transformation
parameter. Moreover, the privacy of the biometric iden-
tity of the patient is preserved in our scheme using the
cancelable transformation of the biometric data. However,
Wang et al. [68], Irshad et al. [66] and Siddiqui et al. [83]
did not include the biometric template revocation phase.
N. EPHEMERAL SECRET LEAKAGE (ESL) ATTACKS
In this attack, an adversary A may try to compute a session
key (SKij) with partial knowledge about the secret credentials.
The SKij is computed as SKij = h(M6||M8||M9||Rs||TS2) =
h(M1||M2||Rc||M13||TS2) (= SK ′ij). In this scheme, the long-
term secrets are UIDi, SIDi and Xj. Similarly, there are two
short-term secrets Rc and Rs. Say, an adversary A knows Rc
and Rs. In this case, A needs to know the secrets UIDi, SIDi
andXj to compute the session key SKij. Again, we assume that
the adversary A knows the secrets UIDi, SIDi and Xj. In this
case, the adversary A needs to know the secrets Rc and Rs,
to construct the session key SKij.
Therefore, an adversary A can compute the SKij success-
fully, when all the secret credentials of Ui are known to him.
Hence, the proposed scheme resists the ESL attacks even
under the assumption of the CK-adversary model. Moreover,
the complete knowledge of a particular session key SK knownij
does not help the attacker to compromise any other session
key. There is no similarity between two different session keys,
because short-term secret credentials are changed in every
session. This means that the forward and backward secrecy
of the session key is achieved in our proposed scheme.
Furthermore, an attacker A by compromising a session does
not affect other sessions. The ESL attack is opposed in our
scheme.
Finally, we consider different known attacks and compare
the proposed scheme with the related existing schemes. The
comparison is presented in Table 6. According to the informal
security analysis, it has been observed that our proposed
protocol resists all the known attacks.
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TABLE 6. Comparison with respect to security features.
TABLE 7. Performance (computation and communication costs) comparisons with existing work.
VI. PERFORMANCE COMPARISONS
In this section, we consider the recent existing schemes
related to our method. The performance of the proposed
scheme is compared with the existing ones [1], [48], [49],
[60], [61], [64]–[68], [78] with respect to their time complex-
ities, computation costs and communication cost.
In our scheme, the password is protected by hash function
under the security of the user-specified secret key K . This
secret key is locked by the patient’s biometric data. It is
required to extract theK from a smart card using unlock oper-
ation with the help of the genuine biometric data.We consider
that the time taken for unlocking K from the smart card is
Tfcs and time taken by the hash function is represented by Th.
Wemeasure the total time taken by a scheme is the addition of
time taken for the login and time taken for the authentication.
The comparison is shown in Table 7. In this table, some other
notations are used to represent execution times of different
functions such as, Tfe : the execution time for a fuzzy extractor
function; Tspm: the execution time for symmetric/asymmetric
encryption/decryption, TM : the execution time of the elliptic
curve point multiplication, TH : the execution time of bio-
hash function. We assume, Th ≈ TH , Tspm ≈ Tfe ≈
Tfcs. We also assume that Th ≈ 0.0023ms, Tspm ≈ 2.226ms
and TM ≈ 0.0046 ms for execution time evaluation
[65], [78]. We also assume that the length of the hash value
is 160 bits, the length of a time stamp is 32 bits, the length
of a random number is 160 bits, and the size of an elliptic
curve point is 320 bits. We also assume that the security of
a 1024-bit public key crypto-system is equivalent to 160-bit
ECC. The computation time and the communication cost of
each scheme are presented in the fifth and sixth columns
of Table 7.
In comparison, the communication cost of our scheme
is lower than the other schemes except [1], [64], [78].
However, Chuang and Chen’s scheme [1] does not satisfy
user anonymity and is vulnerable to server spoofing and
Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. According to the analysis
of Qi and Chen’s scheme [71] in 2018, Chaudhry et al.’s
scheme [64] is not fit for a multi-server environment
and fails to resist the Denial-of-Service attacks (DoS).
Chaudhry et al.’s scheme does not provide the perfect forward
secrecy. Barman et al.’ scheme does not provide a secure
smart card revocation process and it takes more time for the
login and authentication procedures. Therefore, our scheme
is more efficient than the existing ones with respect to the
computation cost and security functions.
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VII. CONCLUSION
This work provides sufficient security measure to the sen-
sitive information of the patients using a biometric-based
authentication scheme on a multi-server environment. In our
scheme, the fuzzy commitment scheme and the error correc-
tion technique are used to handle the noise of the biometric.
The security of our scheme is verified with the BAN logic,
the Real-Or-RandomOracle and the AVISPA tool. The highly
sensitive biometric data is stored neither in the registration
center nor in the medical server. The patient even does not
need to share biometric data with the medical server. The
fast error detection property of the proposed scheme helps to
detect the login failure in an early stage. The performance
analysis shows that our scheme is more efficient than the
existing schemes with respect to cost and security.
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